When researchers start doing a literature search, they often initially find an unmanageably large number of potentially relevant articles, and are forced to refine their searches. Faced with this information overload, prioritization offers an alternative to search refinement, by ordering the articles so that the ones most likely to be relevant are at the top of the list. Effective prioritization relies on having a good model of human decision making that can learn from the way people decide whether articles are relevant, and make predictive decisions about which of the remaining articles will be relevant. In this paper, we develop and evaluate two psychological decision making models for prioritization. One is a 'rational' model that weights and combines all of the available information to make decisions. The other is a 'one reason' model that uses limited time and information. The models are evaluated in an experiment where users evaluated every article returned by PsycINFO for a number of different research topics. The results show that both models achieve a level of prioritization that significantly improves upon the default ordering of PsycINFO. The one reason model is also shown to be superior to the rational model, especially when there are only a few relevant articles. The implications of the results for developing prioritization systems in applied settings are discussed, together with implications for the general modeling of human decision making. In particular, it is argued that there is evidence users do employ one reason decision making when selecting relevant articles, but that the development of better representational techniques is required before prioritization can be used in real-world applications.
Introduction
When a researcher first does a literature search, they usually are only able to supply general search criteria, such as one or two keywords, to indicate their broad topic of interest. Typically, these initial searches will return a large number of potentially relevant articles. Faced with this information overload, one option for the researcher is to refine their search, and hope that a more manageable list of articles is returned. Often, however, this refinement is difficult, because the researcher is unsure exactly what sorts of materials are available, and there is a need to 'sample' or 'explore' the large initial list of articles before a more detailed search can be constructed with any confidence.
Prioritization offers a different approach to dealing with the information overload. The basic idea is to begin presenting the articles, requiring the user to indicate whether or not that article of interest. As each article is examined, prioritization acts to re-order the remaining articles so that the relevant ones are placed at the top of the list. If prioritization is effective, the problem of information overload is solved without the user ever having to construct a refined search. They only need to work from the top of the prioritized list until they reach the point where the articles are no longer of sufficient relevance to be worth pursuing.
While the prioritization problem has been tackled in a variety of information retrieval contexts using machine learning techniques (e.g., Balabanovic 1998; Macskassy, Dayanik, & Hirsh 1999; Mehran, Dumais, Heckerman, & Horvitz 1998) , it has typically not been tackled from a cognitive modeling perspective. This is unfortunate, because prioritization rests on the ability to predict whether or not a user will evaluate an article as a relevant one, and so requires an effective model of human decision making to be successful.
In this paper, we develop and evaluate two cognitive models for the prioritization of literature searches. One is a 'rational' model, that performs exhaustive calculations, while the other is a 'one reason' model, that requires only limited time by making assumptions about the nature of its environment. In the next section, we describe how literature searches are represented by these models, and how information about them is learned. We then describe the two models in detail, before presenting the results of an experiment where both are evaluated on real-world data. Finally, we draw some conclusions regarding the theoretical implications of the results for understanding human decision making, and the applied implications for building a literature search prioritization system.
Two Models of Decision Making Representation and Learning Assumptions
We follow Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) , and a substantial body of other cognitive modeling (e.g., Medin & Schaffer 1978; Tversky 1977) , in representing stimuli in terms of the presence or absence of a set of discrete features or properties, which we call cues. This means that each article is represented by information such as the authors of the article, the journal it appeared in, keywords in the title or the abstract, the language of publication, and so on.
As the user provides information, rating some articles as relevant and rejecting others, it is possible to learn how the individual cues are associated with the different judgments. At any stage, it is known how many times a cue has been associated with a previously presented article, and how many of those articles have been relevant. From these counts, it is possible to measure the evidence the presence of a cue provides for a new article being relevant. In effect, the cues correspond to our representational assumptions, while the adjustment of evidence values associated with the cues correspond to our learning assumptions.
Following Lee, Chandrasena and Navarro (in press), we adopt a Bayesian approach to learning. The basic idea is that we start with complete ignorance about how the cues relate to relevance, and each time a cues is observed to be associated with a relevant article, it comes to provide greater evidence that a new article with the cue will also be relevant. Similarly, as a cue is associated with more irrelevant articles, it provides greater evidence that a new article will also be irrelevant. The basic result from Bayesian statistics (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin 1995, p. 31) we use is that, if an event (such as a cue being associated with a relevant article) occurs k times out of n trials, the best estimate of its underlying probability is (k + 1) / (n + 2). Lee, Chandrasena and Navarro (submiress) provide a more detailed explanation of this Bayesian approach to learning, with a particular focus on its theoretical advantages over other methods.
The rational and one reason models we consider both use cue representations and Bayesian evidence values, but differ in the way they calculate and combine the evidence values to reach a final decision. In this sense, the two models make the same assumptions regarding how people represent and learn about the articles, but make different assumptions regarding their decision processes in judging relevant articles.
The Rational Model
The 'rational' approach assumes that people combine all of the available information is combined in some (near) optimal way. This means that the evidence provided by all of the cues must be weighted and integrated to arrive at a final decision. Because it uses all of the data, the rational approach is often regarded as a normative theory of decision making, and is central to the decision and utility theoretic frameworks widely used in the physical sciences, and in behavioral sciences such as psychology and economics (see Doyle 1999 for an overview).
Our version of a rational approach works by estimating the probability that an article is relevant, as opposed to irrelevant, on the basis of the cues it has. As it turns out, it is simpler to calculate this probability on a log-odds scale. This is a straightforward transformation: a probability of 0.75 means an event will occur three times out of four, which correspond to odds of 3:1, or log-odds of ln 3 ≈ 1.10. The log-odds scale has the advantages of being symmetric about the origin and additive: log-odds of zero mean that the probability of relevance is 0.5, and equal positive or negative increments represent equal amounts of evidence in favor of relevance or irrelevance. It should be emphasized, however, that making decisions based on the log-odds is identical to making decision based on the probabilities themselves.
Formally, the log-odds that an article is relevant (denoted G for 'good'), as opposed to irrelevant (denoted B for 'bad'), given their cue representations, is written as:
Using Bayes' Theorem, this may be re-written as:
The rational model we use here assumes that the evidence provided by each cue is independent when integrating them to give an estimate of the overall log-odds that an article is relevant, so the log-odds becomes:
Given the log-odds for every article, prioritization involves simply sorting from the greatest log-odds value to the smallest. In this way, the articles most likely to be relevant are at the top, and those least likely to be relevant are at the bottom. Notice that, in doing this ordering, the prior odds, p (G) /p (B) will be constant for every article, and so do not need to be calculated. Prioritization is based entirely on the evidence provided by each of the cues associated with the articles.
The evidence values p (
can be estimated on the basis of the user's acceptance or rejection of previous articles. Suppose there have been g relevant articles, in which the i-th cue has been present x times, and b irrelevant articles, in which it has been present y times. Using the Bayesian approach to learning, we have:
It is the sum of these evidence values, for each of the cues belonging to a new article, that gives a rational estimate of the log-odds that it is relevant.
The One Reason Model
In developing their 'fast and frugal' approach to modeling human decision making, Gigerenzer and Todd (1999; see also Gigerenzer & Goldstein 1996; Todd & Gigerenzer 2000) challenge the rational approach. They argue that because human decision making processes evolved in competitive environments, they need to be fast, and because they evolved in changeable environments, they need to have the robustness that comes from simplicity. Rational models usually do not meet these constraints, because they involve extensive and often complicated calculations in their decision making processes. The emphasis of fast and frugal modeling on the role of the environment follows ecological approaches to psychology (e.g., Brunswik 1943; Simon 1956 Simon , 1982 , and suggests that understanding human decision making requires understanding not just mental processes, but also the external task environment, and its interaction with mental processes. As Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) argue, the fact that environments are not arbitrary means that they can play a role in supporting (or confounding) human decision making. For example, in an environment where one piece of information in a stimulus is highly predictive of the remaining pieces of information, and the search for additional information is an effortful process, it is adaptive to consider only the first piece of information. Similarly, in an environment of diminishing returns, where each successive piece of information provides less information than previous pieces, it makes sense to base decisions on the first few pieces of information. Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) show that many real-world stimulus domains have these sorts of information structures, and develop a number of cognitive models that make inferences by assuming the presence of environmental regularities.
Unfortunately, none of these models is directly applicable to prioritization, and so we developed a new model using the basic fast and frugal approach. Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) argue that their models of human decision making are based on simple mechanisms that answer three fundamental questions:
• How should a stimulus environment be searched for information?
• When should this search for information be terminated?
• Once the search has been terminated, what decision should be made given the available information?
In the context of finding relevant articles, as required for prioritization, it is not difficult to provide answers to these questions:
• Unread articles should be searched in terms of cues, looking for articles with cues that provide strong evidence that they are relevant.
• The search should be terminated as soon as a candidate relevant article has been identified. Since users read articles serially, there is no benefit in seeking to sort the unread articles beyond attempting to ensure that at any time the top-most article is the one most likely to be good.
• The best available article should be placed at the top of the list, as the next one to be read by the user.
These answers suggest a simple fast and frugal decision model for prioritization. The cues are ordered in terms of the evidence they provide in favor of an article being relevant. As with the rational model, these evidence values are easily estimated on the basis of the user's acceptance or rejection of previous articles. If the i-th cue has been associated with n articles, k of which were relevant, then the ratio (k + 1) / (n + 2), corresponding to what Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) call the validity of the cue, provides an appropriate measure. Starting with the highest validity cue, a search is made for an unread article with that cue. If this search is successful, the process terminates without considering any further cues. If no article is found, the search continues using the next best cue, and this process is repeated until an article is found. This model is closely related to Take the Best, and belongs to the class of what Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) term 'one reason decision making' models. Only one reason, in the form of the presence of a high evidence cue, is ever required to find the next article for presentation.
Experiment Data Collection
To compare the rational and one reason models, we tested their ability to prioritize literature searches from the PsycINFO (2001) database. Our data set contained ten different literature searches, done by people with experience in using the system, but without detailed knowledge of the models being evaluated. For each of the ten searches, a topic was chosen, and a small set of keywords was chosen for an initial search. Every one of the articles returned by PsycINFO was then evaluated independently, assessing whether or not it was relevant to the topic. Table 1 details the ten literature searches, giving a description of the topic, the initial search keywords, the number of articles returned by the initial search, and the number of articles relevant to the topic found by exhaustive evaluation. The first five topics all relate to different keywords searches, while the remaining five relate to only two different searches. In this way, we are testing prioritization not just of different searches, but also of different topics within the same search. A range of topics are covered, most falling within the discipline of psychology, but with some (e.g., the foreign policy topics) extending into the social sciences more generally. All of the initial searches returned a large number of articles, ranging from 327 to 606. Importantly, the relative number of relevant articles varies significantly, ranging from a very small fraction (e.g., 3 out of 327), to a significant minority (e.g., 127 out of 342). This variation allows us to test the effectiveness of the two models for different base-rates of relevant articles.
Within the datasets, the returned articles were represented using cues defined by standard PsycInfo fields. For each field, the entire text entry for the article was considered, and common English words (such as "the" and "a") were removed using a stoplist. All of the remaining words were used to generate a cue by pairing it with the field name. For example, an article authored by Robert Goldstone would have the cues "Author=Robert" and "Author=Goldstone". The field within which a word appeared was regarded as established a different meaningful context for that word, and so distinct cues were created for repeated words in different fields. This means, for example, that if the word "study" appeared in both the title and the abstract of an article's entry, its representation would include both "Title=study" and "Abstract=study" cues. A complete list of the fields used to create cues is given in Table 2 , together with a concrete example of a cue for each field. Across the ten datasets, the number of cues used to represent all of the articles ranged from 4,346 to 10,712, with a mean of 7,447.
Results
Both the rational and one reason models were applied to the datasets by simulating their impact on the order in which articles would have been presented to users. This was done by presenting the first article in the dataset, and then using the information regarding whether or not it was relevant to update the evidence values for the cues. Using one or other of the decision models, the next prioritized article was then presented, its relevance noted, and evidence scores updated again. This process continued until all of the articles had been presented, and a record was kept of the order in which they had been seen. Figures 1 and 2 summarize the results of 50 independent applications of both models to all ten datasets. They take the form of effort-reward graphs, relating hypothetical levels of effort (i.e., the proportion of the articles read by the user) to the resultant level of reward (i.e., the proportion of relevant articles found). Figure 1 shows the curve representing the mean performance of both models averaged over the datasets. For example, once a user has read the first 60% of the prioritized articles using the one reason model, they have seen about 90% of the relevant articles. Because the models have a stochastic element, arising from breaking ties when two or more articles have equal evidence, the best-and worse-case Differences between extroverted 7 464 and introverted people's ability to deal with noise disturbances "eyewitness testimony"
The use of line-ups 9 379 for identifying suspects -The use of polygraph procedures 4 379 to determine the credibility of eyewitness testimony "foreign policy"
The role of prime ministerial 4 384 leadership styles in foreign decision making -foreign policy using propaganda 4 384 or the impact of propaganda on foreign policy -foreign policy with 17 384 nuclear implications Table 2 : The PsycInfo fields used to define cues, and an example of a cue from each field.
Field Sample Cue
Document Type "Document Type=Journal-Article" Title "Title=conditioning" Author "Author=Jones"
Journal Name "Journal Name=Psychonomic" Language "Language=English" Abstract "Abstract=findings"
Key Phrase "Key Phrase=group"
Age Group "Age Group=Adulthood" Population "Population=Human"
Population Location "Population Location=US"
Publication Type "Publication Type=Empirical-Study" performance is indicated by error bars (where large enough to be visible). The chance level of effort-reward performance, where each extra 10% of reading yields another 10% of the relevant articles, is shown by the thin solid line, and the performance obtained by reading the articles in the default reverse chronological order used by PsycInfo is shown by the thick broken line. The thin broken lines show the best and worst possible performance corresponding, respectively, to the cases where all relevant articles are presented first, and all relevant articles are presented last. It is clear from Figure 1 that the one reason model outperforms the rational model, and that both approaches to prioritization are superior to either the default ordering or a random ordering. Using the one reason model, for example, the first 30% of articles contain more than 60% of the relevant ones, compared to 40% for the rational model. It is also clear, however, that neither of the models achieves anything approaching the best possible performance, and that it is necessary to read all of the articles to guarantee finding all of the relevant ones. Figure 2 shows the weighted average performance across all of the datasets, taking into account the number of relevant articles. This means, for example, that the dataset with nine relevant articles is weighted three times as much as the dataset with three relevant articles in forming the average performance curves. In effect, this aggregation treats all of the datasets as if they were one large multi-faceted search, whereas Figure 1 treats the datasets as a series of separate searches. Under the weighted average, Figure 2 shows the one reason and rational models now have similar performance, and that they remain superior to both the default and random orderings. Once again, however, both models fall short of optimality, and all of the articles must be read to find the relevant ones. The similar performance of the two models under a weighted average in Figure 2 suggests that the better performance of the one reason model in Figure 1 is due to data sets with small numbers of relevant articles. To test this idea, we used a measure of prioritization effectiveness based on effort-reward performance that considered the level of the performance curve in relation to chance performance, averaged across all possible levels of effort. Geometrically, this measure is basically the area between a model's performance curve and the chance line on an effort-reward graph. After normalization, this measure takes the value one for best-case performance, zero for worst-case performance, and 0.5 for chance performance. Figure 3 shows the prioritization performance measure, for both rational and one reason models, as a function of the proportion of relevant articles in the data set. This confirms that, for those data sets with a small proportional of relevant articles, the prioritization performance of the one reason model is generally superior to the rational model. Indeed, for many of these data sets, the rational model does not perform much better than chance. For data sets with a larger proportion of relevant articles, both the models seem to perform similarly, as would be suspected from Figure 2 .
Discussion
We start our discussion by considering the applied implications or our results, before turning to their message for modeling human decision making. Our experimental results demonstrate the potential of prioritization in applied settings, but also show that there is some way to go before a useful applied system can be developed. While both the one reason and rational models clearly outperform the default ordering currently provided by PsycINFO, neither consistently manages to find all of the relevant articles before the user has had to do a significant amount of work. For an applied system, we suspect that something like 90% of the relevant articles would need to be found in the first 20-30% of those presented for almost every topic search. Our conclusion is that, while we believe we are on the right path, some improvement is necessary before the real-world problem of information overload is resolved without the need for refined searches.
This improvement must come from building better models of human decision making, and it is here that our results have some clear lessons. Most importantly, the superior performance of the one reason model over the rational model suggests that more complicated decision processes are probably not the answer. The one reason model uses a single piece of information about an article in deciding it is the best available, whereas the rational model considers every piece of information about every article to make the same decision. Given that the one reason model does better than the rational one, it seems unlikely that adding more complications to the decision mechanisms will yield an improved model. In this sense, our results support Gigerenzer and Todd's (1999) claim that much of human decision making is based on applying a simple heuristic to limited information. The relatively good performance of the one reason model suggests that, at least for some articles, users based their decisions on a single piece of information.
The real deficiency of our decision making models, we suspect, lies in their representations. While PsycINFO users may well regard an article as relevant as soon as they see the author is "Robert Goldstone", the same probably does not apply if they can only see that the first name of the author is "Robert". This means that the important cue is something like "Author=Robert Goldstone", but our current representational approach creates only the separate cues "Author=Robert" and "Author=Goldstone". As has often 
Proportion of Relevant Articles Prioritization Performance
One Reason Rational Figure 3 : The prioritization performance of both models across all of the data sets, shown as a function of the proportion of relevant articles in the data sets.
been noted (e.g., Brooks 1991; Komatsu 1992; Lee 1998; Pinker 1998) , a model of a cognitive process is only as good as the model of stimulus representation on which it relies. Using word boundaries to define cues, as we have, may be appropriate sometimes, but many of the cues to which users are sensitive seem likely to be more complicated. For this reason, we believe that improved prioritization performance will result from developing representational techniques that identify the cues actually used by people, and applying the one reason model to representations of the articles based on these cues. These sorts of representational techniques will, of course, also be required for developing better models of human cognition more generally within the fast and frugal framework.
